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COMMENTS
WHAT IS THE STATUS OF "INADMISSIBLE" BASES
OF EXPERT TESTIMONY?
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Rules of Evidence have broadened the scope of expert
testimony. However, the departure from the common-law tradition has
created ambiguity in the application of some of the federal rules. This
Comment analyzes the application of Federal Rule of Evidence 7031 and
its Wisconsin counterpart, section 907.03 of the Wisconsin Statutes.'
Rule 703 permits an expert to base an opinion on inadmissible data
"[i]f of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field."'3
Courts have, however, interpreted "reasonable reliance" in different
ways. Moreover, highly conflicting opinions exist as to how courts
should treat the underlying inadmissible data.
This Comment begins with a brief look at the common-law practice
preceding Rule 703, as well as the extensive use of expert testimony to-
day. The determination of reasonable reliance and the treatment of
inadmissible bases are then discussed, focusing on Wisconsin's applica-
tion of section 907.03. Finally, a framework for future application of sec-
tion 907.03 is presented.
I. COMMON-LAW BACKGROUND
At common law, expert witnesses were permitted to state their opin-
ions based on firsthand knowledge of the facts or based on facts in the
trial record.4 When an expert based her opinion on facts in the trial
record, the expert either attended the trial while witnesses testified or
was asked a hypothetical question based on the evidence that had been,
or would be, introduced at the trial.5 Consequently, experts were al-
l. FED. R. EVID. 703 states:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases An opinion or infer-
ence may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing.
If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions
or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
2. Vis. STAT. § 907.03 (1991-92). Section 907.03 is identical to FED. R. EvID. 703.
3. FED. R. EVID. 703.
4. JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 14 (4th ed. 1992).
5. Ia
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lowed to formulate opinions based only on admissible evidence. The ra-
tionale for this common-law rule was based on a syllogism that Professor
McElhaney has formed this way:
If an expert opinion was based on hearsay information, relating
the opinion would be giving the jury hearsay in the insidious dis-
guise of an expert opinion. Since hearsay is unreliable unless it
fits within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule, any opinion
based on inadmissible hearsay was also fatally tainted.6
Furthermore, common-law courts reasoned that a jury could only
rely upon facts in the record when evaluating issues at trial; therefore, if
the expert based an opinion on facts not in evidence, the jury could have
no basis for finding the expert's opinion to be true.7
Departing from the traditional rule, which permitted an expert to
base an opinion solely on admissible evidence, some courts began to per-
mit medical doctors to rely upon data outside of the trial record. The
rationale for this departure was summarized by Justice Stevens in Sund-
quist v. Madison Railways Co.8
In making a diagnosis for treatment physicians must of necessity
consider many things that do not appear in sworn proof on the
trial of a lawsuit,-things that mean much to the trained eye and
touch of a skilled medical practitioner. This court has held that it
will not close the doors of the courts to the light which is given by
a diagnosis which all the rest of the world accepts and acts upon,
even if the diagnosis is in part based upon facts which are not
established by the sworn testimony in the case to be true.9
When the hearsay rule and its exceptions were codified in the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, the bases for expert testimony deemed reliable
enough to be admitted into evidence were included as exceptions to the
hearsay rule. Thus, the bases of expert testimony that gave rise to rule
703 are codified as hearsay exceptions in the federal rules. For example,
medical reports, although hearsay, have been held to be trustworthy as a
basis for a medical conclusion. 10 As a result, a hearsay exception has
been created for "[s]tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis
6. Edward B. Amolds, Federal Rule of Evidence 703: The Back Door Is Wide Open, 20
FORUM 1, LEXIS at *4 (Fall 1984).
7. STRONG ET AL., supra note 4, § 15.
8. 197 Wis. 83, 221 N.W. 392 (1928).
9. I. at 87,221 N.W. at 393 (citing Leora v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry. Co., 156
Wis. 386, 395, 146 N.W. 520, 529, error dismissed, 235 U.S. 694 (1914)).
10. Vinicky v. Midland Mut. Casualty Ins. Co., 35 Wis. 2d 246, 254, 151 N.W.2d 77, 82
(1967).
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or treatment."'" In addition, business and government records often
provide the raw data upon which experts' opinions are based. Rules
803(6)12 and 803(8) 13 provide exceptions to the hearsay rule for business
records and government records and reports. Thus, these exceptions al-
low introduction of evidence that typically forms the basis of expert
opinions. Other hearsay exceptions that admit reliable information
upon which an expert may base an opinion are Rules 803(17),' 4 which
includes "[m]arket quotations, tabulations, lists,... or other published
compilations, generally used and relied upon by the public or by persons
in particular occupations," and 803(18),' s the learned treatise exception.
III. TiF PROBLEM WITH EXPERT TESTIMONY
Article VII of the Federal Rules of Evidence has broadened the use
of expert testimony. An expert witness may be qualified by "knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education" and need only "assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue" in order
to testify. 6 As a result, "any minimally qualified practitioner of the ex-
pert discipline at issue is eligible to testify.' 1 7 This broad admissibility
has led to extensive use of expert evidence, which requires careful scru-
tiny of the information a party presents through its expert witnesses.'
The most obvious problem with experts is the "expert for hire." "An
expert can be found to testify to the truth of almost any factual theory,
no matter how frivolous, thus validating the case sufficiently to avoid
11. FED. R. EviD. 803(4) provides':
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is avail-
able as a witness: ... Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment
and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the
inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reason-
ably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
12. FED. R. EviD. 803(6).
13. FED. R. Evm. 803(8).
14. FED. R. Evm. 803(17).
15. FED. R. Evm. 803(18).
16. FED. R. EVID. 702. The rule states that "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Id.
17. Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 1113, 1127.
18. It has been stated that "[s]cientific testimony is one of the most commonly used types
of evidence in modem litigation." Edward J. Imwinkelried, The "Bases" of Expert Testimony:
The Syllogistic Structure of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. Rnv. 1, 23 (1988); see also Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796 (1993) ("Unlike an ordinary wit-
ness.... an expert is permitted wide latitude to offer opinions."); Jack B. Weinstein, Improv-
ing Expert Testimony, 20 U. RicH. L. Rnv. 473 (1986).
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summary judgment and force the matter to trial."'19 At trial, an expert
may obfuscate otherwise simple matters, thus, misleading the jury and
judges.20 Furthermore, not only is expert testimony often complex and
difficult to comprehend, some expert opinions are just plain wrong.
Few studies exist about the use of experts in civil cases. One study,
based on 529 civil trials that led to jury verdicts in California Superior
Courts in 1985 and 1986, reported that experts testified in eighty-six per-
cent of the trials.2 ' More importantly, in 6500 California civil jury trials
from 1980 through 1985, nearly sixty percent of the expert witnesses who
testified were witnesses "who testified in such cases at least two times
over a six-year period."'2 2 "Furthermore, [f]or a particular appearance
before a jury, the average number of times the same expert testified over
a six-year period was 9.4."1 These statistics greatly underrepresent the
experts' actual litigation experience:
They do not, for instance, include testimony in criminal trials or in
civil trials in courts other than California State Superior Courts.
More important, the numbers do not catch the many cases in
which the same experts were consulted, wrote reports, or even
testified in depositions, but failed to testify in court because the
cases were settled or dismissed before trial.24
Based on the California trials, Professor Samuel Gross points out that an
expert witness is twice as likely to have testified in a similar case in the
preceding six months as the attorney examining the witness is to have
tried one.2
Many experts, since they are paid to testify, become professional wit-
nesses. They advertise their services and charge substantial fees for their
"expert" opinions.26 The problem is an obvious one: "[e]xperts whose
incomes depend on testimony must learn to satisfy the consumers who
buy that testimony; those who do not will not get hired."'27 In other
words, an expert for hire is likely to testify to opinions and bases for the
opinions as dictated by the party employing the expert.
19. Weinstein, supra note 18, at 482.
20. 1&
21. Gross, supra note 17, at 1119.




26. Id. at 1131. Professor Gross provides examples of the types of advertisements run by
professional witnesses in typical issues of the National Law Journal and Trial magazine.
27. Id. at 1132.
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Both the bias and complexity, which is a part of most expert testi-
mony, must be considered in applying evidentiary rules to expert testi-
mony. In most cases, a jury must expend more time and effort to
understand scientific testimony than lay testimony.28 The significant
amount of courtroom time devoted to scientific testimony magnifies the
risk that jurors will be unable to disregard the expert evidence.29 A juror
who struggles to understand the information presented by an expert wit-
ness is likely to remember the information because of the time spent
trying to comprehend the data.30 Furthermore, it is difficult enough for
juries to evaluate admissible expert testimony; if inadmissible evidence is
presented by a biased expert witness, the problem is compounded.
Although an expert's bias may be brought out during cross-examina-
tion, it is very important to monitor the information that an expert
presents to the jury. Impeachment during cross-examination of a "pro-
fessional witness," by itself, is not sufficient to address the above-men-
tioned problems. Professional witnesses are not only elusive and
evasive, they often couch their testimony in technical terms, all of which
make impeachment difficult. In addition, highlighting an expert's fee or
the number of times the expert has testified at trials may not have the
desired effect on a jury that is unfamiliar with the prevalence of "experts
for hire." In fact, this form of impeachment may even enhance the wit-
ness' credentials because the jury may be impressed with the expert's
broad range of "expertise." Few juries are aware of the existence of the
professional expert "industry," and a few impeaching questions at trial
are not likely to educate jurors on the magnitude of the problem. Thus,
giving expert witnesses too much latitude in presenting inadmissible evi-
dence to the jury not only confuses jurors, but also leads to abuse.3' For
this reason, trial courts must closely scrutinize the information a party
attempts to present through its expert witnesses.
28. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide Questions of Prelimi-
nary Facts Conditioning the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence?, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv.
577, 604 (1984).
29. Id. at 605.
30. Id. The jury's "struggle to understand the information may enhance the depth of
processing, and that greater depth should make the memory stronger. Similarly, increasing
the temporal duration of exposure to a stimulus tends to solidify the memory of that stimu-
lus." Id.
31. See infra part V for discussion of this potential abuse.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
IV. FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 703
Federal Rule of Evidence 703, which is identical to section 907.03 of
the Wisconsin Statutes, broadens the bases upon which an expert witness
may testify. Not only is an expert permitted to state an opinion based on
admissible facts and data, but also on inadmissible data "[i]f of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opin-
ions or inferences upon the subject."' 2 This phrase raises two significant
questions. First, who determines reasonable reliance? Second, and even
more important, to what extent, if at all, should the inadmissible facts or
data be disclosed to the trier of fact?
A. Reasonable Reliance
The courts have taken two approaches in determining whether data is
of a type reasonably relied on by experts in a particular field. The re-
strictive approach "requires the trial court to determine not only
whether the data are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
field, but also whether the underlying data are untrustworthy for hearsay
or other reasons. ' 33 Judge Weinstein distinguished this approach from
the liberal approach in In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litiga-
tion.34 The plaintiffs in Agent Orange, Vietnam veterans and their fami-
lies, sought to introduce expert affidavits based on forms filled out by the
individual plaintiffs describing their medical history and exposure to
Agent Orange.35 Attached to the forms filled out by the plaintiffs were
checklists which allowed the individual plaintiffs "to identify any or all of
a number of symptoms which they attribute[d] to their exposure to
Agent Orange in Vietnam. '36 Although the plaintiffs' experts con-
tended that the affidavits were based on the kind of information a physi-
cian would require in rendering an opinion, the court excluded the
expert affidavits because the underlying data were so "lacking in proba-
tive force and reliability that no reasonable expert could base an opinion
on them."37
One criticism of the restrictive view is that the question of reliability
of the underlying bases is similar to an inquiry of whether the data meet
32. FED. R. EvID. 703; WIS. STAT. § 907.03 (1991-92).
33. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1985),
aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nora. Lombardo v. Dow Chemical Co., 487
U.S. 1234 (1988) [hereinafter Agent Orange].
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1235.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1245.
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a residual hearsay exception, which would make the data independently
admissible. Because Rule 703 explicitly states that the underlying data
may be inadmissible, this level of scrutiny is inconsistent with the rule's
intent.3 Another criticism of this view is that a judge, who is not as
familiar with the subject area as the expert witness, must evaluate the
trustworthiness of the data.3 9 A judge may not be knowledgeable about
the various scientific theories and data that form the bases for an ex-
pert's opinion, yet under the restrictive approach, the judge must deter-
mine if the data are reliable.
In contrast, the liberal approach "allows the expert to base an opin-
ion on data of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field
without separately determining the trustworthiness of the particular data
involved." 40 This approach is exemplified by In re Japanese Electronic
Products Antitrust Litigation.4' In Japanese Products, the trial court ap-
plied a restrictive approach in determining reasonable reliance. The trial
court did not consider "the affidavits submitted by the plaintiffs' experts
to the effect that the material upon which they relied in forming their
opinions is of a type generally relied upon by experts in their respective
fields as in any way determinative of the issue."42 The Third Circuit held
that the trial court erred in excluding the experts' opinions on the
ground that they were based on material not reasonably relied upon by
the experts.43 The court stated, "The proper inquiry is not what the
court deems reliable, but what experts in the relevant discipline deem it
to be.... In substituting its own opinion as to what constitutes reason-
able reliance for that of the experts in the relevant fields the trial court
misinterpreted Rule 703."1
Wisconsin courts have taken the liberal approach in determining rea-
sonable reliance. Generally, the determination consists of an inquiry of
the expert witness as to whether other experts in the field rely upon the
data that form the basis of the expert's opinion. Brain v. Mann4' demon-
strates the approach currently utilized in Wisconsin.
38. Arnolds, supra note 6, at *8.
39. Id.
40. Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1244 (citing Arnolds, supra note 6, at *7).
41. 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
42. Id. at 276 (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus., 505 F. Supp. 1125,
1325-26 (E.D. Pa. 1980)).
43. Id. at 278.
44. Id. at 276-77.
45. 129 Wis. 2d 447, 385 N.W.2d 227 (Ct. App. 1986).
1994]
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In Brain, the trial court struck the testimony of the plaintiff's expert
vocational rehabilitation specialist because the expert based his opinion
on two surveys conducted and published by the Department of Health
and Human Resources.46 The trial court, applying the restrictive ap-
proach, concluded that the data was both unreliable and prejudicial to
the defendant.4 7 The court of appeals reversed, stating that "the trial
court incorrectly focused on the statistical soundness of the surveys used
by [the expert]." 4 The court continued, "[t]he crucial factor... was [the
expert's] uncontroverted testimony that these surveys were recognized
source material upon which vocational rehabilitation consultants cus-
tomarily rely in the ordinary course of their professional work."'49
In Wisconsin, data is deemed reliable if experts in the particular field
rely on the data in forming their opinions.50 In fact, it appears it is not
even necessary for the expert witness to state that her opinion is based
on facts or data relied on by other experts in the field. In Kolpin v.
Pioneer Power & Light Co., Inc.95 1 an expert who relied on hearsay in
forming his opinion was permitted to testify even though the expert "did
not say the 'magic words'-'reasonably relied upon by experts in the
field.' " The Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that the bases for the
expert's opinion "clearly are of the type experts would rely on in formu-
lating an opinion. ' 51 Kolpin illustrates the laxness and proves the futility
of the reasonable reliance standard in Wisconsin.
A major criticism of this approach is that any expert witness hired by
a party to testify will state that her opinion is based on data reasonably
relied on by experts in her field. As a result, any data that an expert
bases an opinion on is of the type "reasonably relied upon" by other
experts in her particular field, and the expert testimony is permitted.
Thus, the main issue raised by the restrictive and liberal approaches is
whether reasonable reliance is a decision for the judge or solely the
province of the expert. The restrictive view obviously considers the rea-
sonable reliance determination to be a decision for the judge. However,
even under the liberal approach, reasonable reliance should not be solely
determined by the expert. For example, in cases where there is conflict-
46. Id. at 457-58, 385 N.W.2d at 232.
47. Id. at 458, 385 N.W.2d at 232.
48. Id. at 459, 385 N.W.2d at 233.
49. Id. at 459-60, 385 N.W.2d at 233.
50. Id. at 461-62, 385 N.W.2d at 233-34.
51. 162 Wis. 2d 1, 469 N.W.2d 595 (1991).
52. Id. at 37, 469 N.W.2d at 609.
53. Id.
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ing expert evidence on the issue of reasonable reliance, the judge must
decide whether to permit the expert testimony under either the liberal or
the restrictive approach.54
Wisconsin's liberal approach to determining reasonable reliance is
not overly troublesome with regard to the expert's opinion. However, a
liberal approach in allowing inadmissible data underlying the expert's
opinion to reach the trier of fact is very problematic. If experts are per-
mitted to testify in detail about the inadmissible bases of their opinions,
any inadmissible information that a party wishes to present to the jury is
likely to become a "basis" for the expert's testimony.55
B. Disclosure of Inadmissible Bases
A great deal of debate has focused on the treatment of the inadmissi-
ble bases that underlie an expert's opinion. Neither the Federal Rules
nor the advisory committee's notes to the Federal Rules address the
question of how courts should treat the inadmissible bases of expert tes-
timony. Federal Rule of Evidence 70556 and section 907.0551 of the Wis-
consin Statutes explicitly provide that an expert may state her opinion
without disclosing the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires
otherwise.58 Thus, rule 703 and section 907.03 do not provide a license
for experts to present to the jury every facet of the expert's rationale and
analysis.
One side of the debate claims that full disclosure of the underlying
data is appropriate because the trier of fact "cannot intelligently evalu-
ate the worth of the expert's opinion unless the trier has the benefit of
[the underlying data]" that forms the basis of the expert's opinion. 9
Rule 703 has even been referred to as a quasi-hearsay exception, and
some courts have received the underlying data as substantive evidence.60
One justification for treating the inadmissible bases as hearsay excep-
54. The judge must make this decision under FED. R. EVID. 104(a), which states that
preliminary questions concerning the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the
court.
55. The expert will simply testify that the inadmissible information is of a type that ex-
perts in the field reasonably rely upon.
56. FED. R. Evm. 705.
57. Wis. STAT. § 907.05 (1991-92).
58. Section 907.05 is identical to Rule 705: "The expert may testify in terms of opinion or
inference and give reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data,
unless the judge requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the
underlying facts or data on cross-examination."
59. Imwinkelried, supra note 18, at 26.
60. STRONG ET AL., supra note 4, § 324.2.
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tions is that reasonable reliance by experts in the field adequately as-
sures reliability.61
Rule 703 is not, however, a hearsay exception. First, if the advisory
committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence had intended the inadmissi-
ble bases of expert testimony to be hearsay exceptions, the exceptions
would appear in Article VIII along with the other hearsay exceptions.
Second, permitting full disclosure of an expert's underlying inadmissible
bases could lead to serious abuse, especially in jurisdictions applying a
liberal view of reasonable reliance. The underlying data, if inadmissible,
does not provide the guarantees of trustworthiness present in the excep-
tions to the hearsay rule. The bases for an expert's testimony are very
likely to be controlled by the party employing the expert, hardly an unbi-
ased source.
Not all proponents of "full disclosure" argue that Rule 703 should be
treated as a hearsay exception. Some argue that the underlying data are
admissible for the limited purpose of informing the jury of the bases of
the expert's opinion, but not as substantive evidence. A limiting instruc-
tion under these circumstances is, as Professor Rice puts it, a "pure fic-
tion."'6 He states that "instructing the jury not to accept the recited
facts as true (even though the expert did), but to consider those facts
only in assessing the value of the expert's opinion" is absurd.6 3 He fur-
ther states that:
A limiting instruction in this instance is absurd not only because
jurors are asked to do something completely illogical but also be-
cause jurors cannot follow this instruction; the expert can accept
the underlying data as true, but the jurors cannot? Even the Ad-
visory Committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence, in its notes to
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4), has acknowledged that this dis-
tinction is one "most unlikely to be made by juries. '
Although the inadmissible bases of expert testimony are usually
inadmissible for hearsay reasons, the bases may also be inadmissible for
other evidentiary reasons. For example, Federal Rule of Evidence 407
prohibits the introduction of subsequent remedial measures to prove
negligence or culpable conduct.65 If an expert reasonably relied on the
subsequent remedial measure in forming her opinion, permitting full dis-
61. Paul R. Rice, Inadmissible Evidence as a Basis for Expert Opinion Testimony: A Re-
sponse to Professor Carlson, 40 VAND. L. REv. 583, 587-88 (1987).
62. Id. at 585.
63. Id.
64. Id. (quoting FED. R. EvID. 803(4) advisory committee note).
65. FED. R. EvID. 407.
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closure of the expert's underlying inadmissible bases would undermine
Rule 407.
The opposite side of the debate argues against full disclosure of the
underlying inadmissible bases of expert opinions. This view opposes the
wholesale introduction of underlying data and supports the use of a lim.-
iting instruction if any of the data is mentioned by the expert.66 The
underlying data may only be mentioned "for the limited purpose of dem-
onstrating what data the expert relied upon."67 This is the more reason-
able of the two views, especially since limiting instructions are ineffective
in preventing a jury from accepting an expert's bases as substantive evi-
dence even when "inadmissible" for that purpose.
V. APPLICATIoN OF SEcrioN 907.03
The various approaches in determining reasonable reliance and dif-
fering views on how to treat the data underlying an expert's opinion
have led to contradictory and often confusing results among the courts.
The confusion is apparent when one looks at the cases applying section
907.03 of the Wisconsin Statutes.
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals' decisions in this area have been
quite inconsistent. In State v. Mann,68 the court of appeals stated that
"the hearsay rule is generally inapplicable to the facts or data upon
which an expert witness bases his or her opinion; if the facts or data are
of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the field, they need not
themselves be admissible in evidence. ' 69 In Mann, the court admitted
an autopsy report prepared by a since-deceased physician because it was
utilized by expert medical witnesses in forming their conclusions.7 °
The most troublesome application of section 907.03 was in Bagnow-
ski v. Preway, Inc.,71 in which the court of appeals referred to section
907.03 as "another hearsay exception."7' In Bagnowski, an expert fire
fighter relied on hearsay in forming his opinion of the cause of a fire.73
Citing to the third edition of McCormick on Evidence, the court stated
66. See generally Ronald L. Carlson, Policing the Bases of Modern Expert Testimony, 39
VAND. L. Rv. 577 (1986) (arguing that the wholesale introduction of underlying inadmissible
data is totally inappropriate).
67. Ronald L. Carlson, Collision Course in Expert Testimony: Limitations on Affirmative
Introduction of Underlying Data, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 234, 243 (1984).
68. 135 Wis. 2d 420, 400 N.W.2d 489 (Ct. App. 1986).
69. Id. at 427, 400 N.W.2d at 492.
70. Id.
71. 138 Wis. 2d 241, 405 N.W.2d 746 (Ct. App. 1987).




that an expert is competent to evaluate the reliability of hearsay state-
ments; therefore, hearsay that an expert relies upon in forming her opin-
ion is admissible.74 Considering the language used in Mann, it is
understandable why the court in Bagnowski referred to section 907.03 as
a hearsay exception.
Contrary results were reached in Condition of S.Y v. Eau Claire
County7" and State v. Coogan,76 where the court of appeals held that an
expert may not act as a conduit for inadmissible evidence.77 In Coogan,
an expert psychiatrist relied in part on inadmissible hypnotically-re-
freshed testimony.78 The expert's opinion was admissible; however, the
legally inadmissible data forming the basis of the expert's opinion was
not.79
In Coogan, the court of appeals made reference to Nachtsheim v.
Beech Aircraft Corp.,8" a significant decision in the application of Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 703. In Nachtsheim, the district court excluded
testimony about an airplane crash which was inadmissible even though
the plaintiff's expert relied on the data in forming his opinion.8' The
Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's use of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 4031 to exclude the expert testimony regarding the plane crash.83
The court stated, "to say that Rule 703 permits an expert to base his
opinion upon materials that would otherwise be inadmissible does not
necessarily mean that material independently excluded by the court by
reason of another rule of evidence will automatically be admitted under
Rule 7032"84
The contradictory applications of section 907.03, evidenced by Mann
and Bagnowski on the one hand, and S.Y. and Coogan on the other,
74. Id at 252, 405 N.W.2d at 751.
75. 156 Wis. 2d 317, 457 N.W.2d 326 (Ct. App. 1990) ("While experts may rely on inad-
missible evidence in forming opinions, the underlying evidence is still inadmissible."), aff'd,
162 Wis. 2d 320, 469 N.W.2d 836 (1991).
76. 154 Wis. 2d 387, 453 N.W.2d 186 (Ct. App. 1990), review denied, 153 Wis. 2d li, 454
N.W.2d 806, (1990).
77. Id. at 399, 453 N.W.2d at 190.
78. Id. at 400, 453 N.W.2d at 190-91.
79. Id.
80. 847 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1988).
81. Id at 1270.
82. FED. R. Evm. 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence."
83. Nachtsheim, 847 F.2d at 1271.
84. Id. at 1270.
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prompted a proposal to amend section 907.03. The Judicial Council of
Wisconsin suggested renumbering section 907.03 to section 907.03(1) and
adding a subsection, 907.03(2), which would read:
Where the facts or data underlying the expert opinion or infer-
ence are otherwise inadmissible in evidence but [are] of a type
reasonably relied upon by such experts as provided in sub. (1),
the judge, after an analysis of the considerations set forth in s.
904.03, may permit some or all of this information to be disclosed
to the jury under this subsection or s. 907.05, for the limited pur-
pose of establishing the basis for the expert's opinion or
inference.85
While the amendment to section 907.03 was under consideration, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court decided Kolpin v. Pioneer Power & Light Co.,
Inc.,S6 discussed in section IV.A. In Kolpin, the court clarified that the
hearsay relied upon in forming the expert's opinion was "admissible for
the limited purpose of serving as a basis for the opinion." 87 In a foot-
note, the court stated that section 907.03 "is not to be confused with a
'hearsay exception'. To do so would be to say the hearsay is admissible
and can be used by any witness for the truth of the matter asserted." 88
Because Kolpin corrected Bagnowski's characterization of section
907.03 as "another hearsay exception," the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
on February 19, 1992, remanded the proposed amendment of section
907.03 to the Judicial Council for further consideration.89 Although the
court in Kolpin clarified that section 907.03 is not a hearsay exception,
the court did not make clear to what extent the underlying facts may be
disclosed for the limited purpose of serving as a basis for the expert's
opinion. As discussed previously, a jury is not likely to distinguish testi-
mony offered solely as a basis for the expert's opinion from substantive
evidence offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Furthermore, be-
cause Wisconsin takes such a liberal approach in determining data that
are reasonably relied upon by experts, the potential for abuse of section
907.03 is substantial. The liberal approach in determining reasonable re-
liance, combined with full disclosure of the underlying bases, permits a
party to present untrustworthy facts and data to the jury through the
85. Wis. STAT. § 907.03(2) (Proposed Amendment 1991).
86. 162 Wis. 2d 1, 469 N.W.2d 595 (1991).
87. Id. at 37, 469 N.W.2d at 609-10.
88. Id. at 37 n.10, 469 N.W.2d at 610 n.10.
89. In re the Amendment of the Rules of Evidence: Sec. 907.03, Stats. Wisconsin Supreme
Court Order (Feb. 19, 1992).
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guise of an expert witness. Arguably, a party could present her entire
case through an expert's testimony.
The most appropriate analysis in the application of section 907.03
was utilized in State v. Weber.90 The court of appeals recognized that
section 907.03 admits only the expert's opinion, not the inadmissible ba-
ses that support the expert's opinion. In Weber, the trial court admitted
the hearsay testimony of a medical expert who stated that the defendant
told a resident at the state hospital that he was going to handle his legal
case by acting "mentally ill" and looking "crazy."'" The trial court rea-
soned that since medical experts routinely rely on hearsay information,
the underlying hearsay data was both reliable and admissible.92 How-
ever, the court of appeals held that
[s]ection 907.03 allows an expert to base an opinion upon data
that constitute hearsay if the data are of a type reasonably relied
upon. However, sec. 907.03 is not a hearsay exception. Hearsay
data upon which the expert's opinion is predicated may not be
automatically admitted into evidence by the proponent and used
for the truth of the matter asserted unless the data are otherwise
admissible under a recognized exception to the hearsay rule.
93
Significantly, only Weber94 has addressed a court's disclosure options
with respect to the inadmissible data reasonably relied upon by ex-
perts.95 The court noted that sections 907.03, 907.05, and 904.03 permit
the trial court several disclosure options, even though the data is inad-
missible for the truth of the matter asserted:
The court may permit full disclosure of the inadmissible hearsay
basis followed by a limiting instruction which informs the jury
that the basis may not be used for its truth. The court may pre-
clude any mention of the inadmissible hearsay basis during the
proponent's direct examination, allowing only the expert's opin-
ion that is founded upon it. Finally, the court may edit the inad-
missible hearsay basis so that the jury is informed generally about
its nature, but withhold the full details.96
Subsequent to Weber, the court in Heyden v. Safeco Title Insurance
Co.,97 stated:
90. 174 Wis. 2d 98, 496 N.W.2d 762 (Ct. App. 1993).
91. Id. at 105, 496 N.W.2d at 766.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 106-07, 496 N.W.2d at 766 (citations omitted).
94. 174 Wis. 2d 98, 496 N.W.2d 762 (Ct. App. 1993).
95. Id. at 107 n.6, 496 N.W.2d at 766 n.6.
96. Id. See infra part VI for a discussion of these options.
97. 175 Wis. 2d 508, 498 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1993).
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Absent extraordinary circumstances that call for the imposition of
Rule 904.03, Stats. (exclusion of relevant evidence), a party call-
ing an expert witness is entitled to have that witness explain the
bases for his or her opinion; matters upon which an expert relies
in formulating an opinion may be disclosed to the jury "as a basis
for the opinion" even though Rule 907.03, Stats., does not permit
those matters to be received as substantive evidence.98
The use of the term "extraordinary" is troublesome, but it should not be
read as undercutting the options discussed in Weber. First, this language
is dicta. Second, the underlying data in Heyden were insurance stan-
dards set out in a section of the Wisconsin Administrative Code, which
were also admissible as substantive evidence.99 Third, Heyden did not
cite, much less discuss, Weber's elaborate discussion of the disclosure
options.
Thus far this discussion has focused on the admissibility of underlying
data on direct examination of an expert. The situation is quite different
when an expert witness is questioned by an adverse party. In Karl v.
Employers Insurance,1' ° the plaintiffs moved a written report prepared
by their family physician into evidence during the recross-examination of
the defendants' expert psychiatrist.1 1 The defendants' expert stated that
he "reviewed" the written reports of the plaintiffs' expert in forming his
conclusions.' ° The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the trial court's
admission of the report, stating that
facts relied on by the expert may be admitted for the limited pur-
pose of impeachment and verbal clarity. If a party's expert relies
on certain data, "fair play" requires that the opponent may show
that the data relied on did not support the conclusions of the testi-
fying expert, or that the data relied on contained information ig-
nored by the testifying expert.103
Karl does not address whether any portion of an expert's inadmissible
bases is admissible by a proponent of the expert's testimony.
A similar conclusion was reached in Liles v. Employers Mutual Insur-
ance.'04 In Liles, the trial court refused to allow a letter written by a
supervisor of a research institute to be introduced by the defendant dur-
98. Id. at 522, 498 N.W.2d at 910 (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 521-22, 498 N.W.2d at 910.
100. 78 Wis. 2d 284, 254 N.W.2d 255 (1977).
101. Id. at 298, 254 N.W.2d at 261.
102. I&
103. I& at 300, 254 N.W.2d at 262 (citing Vinicky v. Midland Mut. Casualty Ins. Co., 35
Wis. 2d 246, 255, 151 N.W.2d 77, 82 (1967)).
104. 126 Wis. 2d 492, 377 N.W.2d 214 (Ct. App. 1985).
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ing the cross-examination of the plaintiff's expert vocational rehabilita-
tion counselor.10 5 The plaintiff's expert testified about the plaintiff's
loss of future earning capacity, basing his testimony in part on the fact
that there was a shortage of nursing positions.106 The letter offered into
evidence by the defendant suggested that there was a shortage of nurses
rather than a shortage of nursing positions. 7 The court of appeals held
that the trial court erred by refusing to allow cross-examination on the
basis of the information in the letter because the plaintiff's expert "indi-
cated that information contained in the letter represented the type of
information he received and customarily relied upon in arriving at an
opinion as to loss of future earning capacity."' 1 8 The court concluded
that even though the facts in the letter may have been inadmissible, sec-
tion 907.03 permitted the defendant to request an opinion from the ex-
pert based on the facts because they were "of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field."' 0 9
Karl and Liles correctly applied section 907.03. The danger that a
party will introduce prejudicial, inadmissible evidence through an ad-
verse expert witness is far less than the danger of abuse by permitting
the same for the proponent of the expert witness. The concern that a
party opposing an expert witness will use that expert as a conduit for
inadmissible evidence is diminished because the expert's bias"0 is to-
ward the proponent of the expert witness, not the opponent.
VI. A FRAMEWORK FOR FuTuRE APPLICATION OF SEcriON 907.03
The judicial council note to the proposed amendment of section
907.03 suggested that trial judges apply the factors in section 904.03"' of
the Wisconsin Statutes in deciding whether to permit disclosure to the
jury of the facts or data underlying the expert's opinion or inference,
even though the underlying facts or data are not substantive evidence." 2
The judicial council further notes that under this approach, a trial judge
may address the underlying bases of an expert's testimony in several dif-
105. Id. at 504, 377 N.W.2d at 220.
106. Id. at 504-05, 377 N.W.2d at 220.
107. Id. at 505, 377 N.W.2d at 220.
108. Id. at 505-506, 377 N.W.2d at 221 (citation omitted).
109. Id. at 506, 377 N.W.2d at 221.
110. See infra part III for a discussion of this bias.
111. Wis. STAT. § 904.03 (1991-92). The statute reads, "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-
dice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." I&.
112. Id. § 907.03 judicial council's note to proposed amendment (1991).
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ferent ways." 3 First, the judge may permit the expert to disclose the
details of the inadmissible bases to the jury. 14 If this option is chosen, a
limiting instruction must be given to inform the jury that the underlying
data may not be used for substantive purposes." 5 Second, the judge
may limit disclosure to "a general reference to the source or nature of
the basis."" 6 This option presents a compromise between "the propo-
nent's interest in educating the jury about the expert's opinion and the
opponent's concern that the evidence will be misused.' 1 7 Finally, "the
trial court may preclude any mention at all of the inadmissible bases,
allowing only the expert opinion testimony that is predicated upon it.""' 8
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals, in substance, adopted this construction
of the present version of section 907.03 in Weber." 9
This construction recognizes that limiting instructions are not effec-
tive in preventing juries from using the underlying inadmissible data for
substantive purposes. Trial judges must consider the factors in section
904.03 when determining whether or not to permit disclosure of the
inadmissible bases of an expert's testimony, keeping in mind that limit-
ing instructions are of little value in this instance. Furthermore, it is ap-
parent that while the court of appeals has recently correctly interpreted
and applied section 907.03, trial courts are still somewhat confused as to
how to treat the inadmissible data underlying an expert's opinion.1
20
Professor Daniel Blinka, who is cited by the court in Weber,121 sug-
gests a distinction in the types of hearsay on which experts base their
opinions and which the courts should consider in exercising their discre-
tion. "Bedrock hearsay" forms the common knowledge of experts in the
field: "Issues involving this form of hearsay will most often implicate
threshold determinations of the expert's qualifications, the relevance of
scientific evidence, and the expert's reasonable reliance on such ba-
ses." 22 Full disclosure of bedrock hearsay is generally appropriate be-
113. I d; see also 7 DANIEL D. BLINKA, WISCONSIN PRACTICE: EVIDENCE § 703.4 (1991).
114. Wis. STAT. § 907.03 judicial council's note to proposed amendment (1991).
115. 7 BLINKA, supra note 113, § 703.4, at 389.
116. WIs. STAT. § 907.03 judicial council's note to proposed amendment (1991).
117. 7 BLINKA, supra note 113, § 703.4, at 389.
118. Id
119. 174 Wis. 2d 98, 107 n.6, 496 N.W.2d 762, 766 n.6 (Ct. App. 1993).
120. Note the trial court's application of § 907.03 in State v. Weber, 174 Wis. 2d 98, 496
N.W.2d 762 (Ct. App. 1993); S.Y. v. Eau Claire County, 156 Wis. 2d 317,457 N.W.2d 326 (Ct.
App. 1993); and State v. Coogan, 154 Wis. 2d 387, 453 N.W.2d 186 (Ct. App. 1990).
121. 174 Wis. 2d at 107 n.6, 496 N.W.2d at 766 n.6.
122. 7 BLINKA, supra note 113, § 703.4, at 390. For examples of bedrock hearsay, see E.D.
Wesley Co. v. City of New Berlin, 62 Wis. 2d 668, 675, 215 N.W.2d 657, 661 (1974) (pamphlet
on torque reversal); State v. Pankow, 144 Wis. 2d 23, 37, 422 N.W.2d 913, 917 (Ct. App. 1988)
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cause of the diminished risk that the jury will (or could) use the
information for any purpose other than assessing the expert's qualifica-
tions and opinion testimony.123
The second type of hearsay on which an expert may base an opinion
is "case specific hearsay". 24 This form of hearsay includes data (e.g., a
report from a party's attorney) that relates directly to the facts of a par-
ticular case. Trial courts should not permit full disclosure of this form of
hearsay. Since limiting instructions are generally ineffective under these
circumstances,'125 it is this type of hearsay that poses the greatest danger
of unfair prejudice if inadmissible evidence is presented to the jury.
Therefore, trial courts must exercise scrutiny in deciding whether to give
the jury any details of "case specific hearsay" that forms the basis for an
expert's opinion.
VII. CONCLUSION
Both Federal Rule of Evidence 703 and section 907.03 of the Wiscon-
sin Statutes permit an expert to base an opinion on facts or data that are
not admissible in evidence. However, the rules do not provide or imply
that these inadmissible facts may be introduced to the trier of fact by a
proponent of the expert witness. "Accordingly, [w]hle Rule 703 permits
an expert witness to take into account matters which are unadmitted and
inadmissible, it does not follow that such a witness may simply report
such matters to the trier of fact."'1 2 6
A great deal of debate has surrounded the application of Federal
Rule of Evidence 703. Specifically, courts have devised differing tests in
determining reasonable reliance as well as developed conflicting views
on the treatment of underlying inadmissible data. In adopting section
907.03, Wisconsin courts adopted the ambiguity inherent in Rule 703.
Wisconsin courts should resolve this ambiguity in favor of stricter scru-
tiny of expert testimony, especially with respect to inadmissible evidence
presented by an expert witness. Moreover, attorneys should be aware
that the use of limiting instructions for the inadmissible bases is not auto-
matic. Unless an objection is made, the inadmissible bases underlying an
expert's testimony are admitted as substantive evidence.
(mathematical probability evidence); In re Paternity of T.L.S., 125 Wis. 2d 399, 400, 373
N.W.2d 55, 55 (Ct. App. 1985) (computer-aided blood tests).
123. 7 BLINKA, supra note 113, § 703.4, at 390.
124. IdL
125. See supra part IV.B.
126. DAVID W. LOuISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 389, at
663 (1979).
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The judicial council note to the proposed amendment of section
907.03 and Professor Daniel Blinka suggest a framework trial courts
should consider when applying section 907.03. Trial courts should distin-
guish bedrock hearsay from case-specific hearsay and consider the im-
pact of disclosing inadmissible bases of expert testimony to the jury with
the recognition that limiting instructions do not necessarily eliminate
abuse or unfair prejudice. In addition, trial courts should consider sec-
tion 904.03 in deciding whether to permit disclosure of any of the under-
lying inadmissible data. Thus, the abuse and unfair prejudice that has
resulted from improper application of section 907.03 may be controlled
by attorneys through timely objections and by trial courts through closer
scrutiny.
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